Introduction
A pseudo-random (p.r.) function, as defined by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [13] , is a function that is indistinguishable from a truly random function to a (polynomial-time bounded) observer who can access the function as a black-box (i.e. can provide inputs of his choice and gets to see the value of the function on these inputs). P.r. functions are the key component of private-key cryptography. They allow parties who share a common key to send secret messages to each other, to identify themselves and to authenticate messages [7, 14, 10, 281 . In addition they have many other applications, essentially in any setting that calls for a random function that is provided as a black-box [ Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali provided a construction of such functions. This is the only known construction, even under specific assumptions, such as "factoring is hard". Their construction is sequential in nature and consists of n successive invocations of a p.r. generator (where n is the number of bits in the input to the function). Our goal in this paper is to present an alternative construction for p.r. functions that can be implemented in log n phases.
We introduce a new cryptographic primitive which we call pseudo-random synthesizer. A p.r. synthesizer is a two variable function S(x, y), so that if many (but polynomidy bounded) random assignments are chosen to x and to y, the output of S on all the combinations of these assignments is indistinguishable from random to a polynomial time observer. Our main results are:
1. A construction of p.r. functions based on p.r. synthesizers. Evaluating such a function involves log n phases where each phase consists of evaluating several synthesisers in parallel.
Constructions of parallel (NC?) synthesizers based
on standard assumptions such as RSA (it is hard to extract roots modulo a composite) and DiffieHellman and a very simple construction based on a problem from learning. The key generating algorithm of these constructions is sequential for RSA, non-uniformly parallel for Diffie-Hellman and parallel for the learning problem.
Taking (1) and (2) together we get a p.r. function that can be evaluated in NCa. We note that our constructions do not weaken the security of the underlining assumption. For instance, in the RSA case, if there is an algorithm for breaking our construction in time t and success a (success CY means that the observer has a bias of at least cy in distinguishing the p.r. function from the random one), then there is an algorithm for breaking RSA that works in time paly(t) and breaks RSA with probability a/poly (t) . See [18, 281 for a discussion of security preserving reductions.
The class N C has been criticized as a model for parallel computation for two main reasons:
e It ignores communication delays and other parameters that determine the execution time on an actual parallel machine.
e It over-emphasizes latency rather than the speedup of problems.
These criticisms seem less valid for the problem of constructing p.r. functions, since (a) it is likely that it will be implemented in a special purpose circuit (as there are DES chips) and (b) when used for the encryption of messages on a network, the latency of computing the function is added to the latency of the network and hence it makes sense to minimize it. Furthermore, if the complexity of evaluating a synthesizer on a given input is comparable to that of a p.r. generator, then the work performed by our construction is comparable to the one in [13] and we can get optimal speed-up.
There is a deep connection between p.r. functions and hardness results for of learning. Since a random function cannot be learned, if a concept class is strong enough to contain p.r. functions we cannot hope to learn it efficiently. Since no construction of p.r. functions in N C was known, several ways of bypassing this were suggested [24, 251 . It is still of interest to learning theory to find a distribution of concepts that is hard to learn [19] . By strengthening our assumptions, say, that it is hard to break RSA in time n0(logn) we can get a p.r. function in NC'. In [3] a way of using problems that are hard to learn for cryptographic purposes was proposed. We discuss the connection between our work and learning in Section 8. In general, we can use hardto-learn problems to obtain p.r. synthesizers and thus p.r. functions.
Another application of p.r. functions in complexity was suggested by the work on Natural Proofs [31] . They showed that the existence of a p.r. function in NC' implies that there are no what they called Natural Proofs (which include all known lower bound techniques) for separating N C 1 from P. Our construction based on the strengthened Diffie-Hellman assumption satisfies that.
Previous work:
Impagliazzo & Naor [21] have provided parallel constructions for several cryptographic primitives based on the hardness of subset sum (and factoring). The primitives include p.r. generators, universal one-way hash functions and strong bit-commitments.
An idea of Levin [26] is to construct from p.r. generators that expand the input by a factor of 2 (like the one in [21] ) p.r. functions by selecting some secret hash function h and applying the GGM construction [13] to h(c) instead of c. If IS(c)l = log2n then the depth of the tree is only loga n and presumably we get a p.r. function in NC. The problem with this idea is that we have decreased the security significantly: with probability f/nlo8" the function can be broken, irrespective of the security guaranteed by the p.r. generator. To put this construction in the "correct" light, suppose that for security parameter k we have some problem whose solution requires time 2k (on instance of size polynomial in k). If we would like to have security 1/2k for our p.r. function, then the Levin construction requires depth k whereas our construction requires depth log k. Luby & Fiackoff [29] have shown how to construct p.r. permutations from p.r. functions. Their construction is very simple and involves three or four invocations of a p.r. function in order to evaluate the p.r. permutation at a given point. Therefore, our constructions yield p.r.
permutations in NC as well. Organization of the paper: In section 2 we review the definition of p.r. functions, in section 3 we define p.r. synthesizers and collections of p.r. synthesizers and discuss their characteristics. In section 4 we present our parallel construction of p.r. functions from p.r. synthesizers, in section 5 we prove the security of this construction. In section 6 we discuss the relationships between p.r. synthesizers and other cryptographic primitives. In section 7 we present the constructions of p.r.
synthesizers based on the Diffie-Hellman and the RSA assumptions. In section 8 we show how to construct p.r. synthesizers from hard-to-learn problems and consider a very simple concrete example, we also discuss the construction of p.r. functions in N e ' .
Pseudo-Random Functions
For the sake of completeness and concreteness, we briefly review in this section the concept of p.r. functions as it appears in [lo] (some of the definitions may have small variations). Informally, a p.r. function ensemble is a distribution of functions that cannot be efficiently distinguished from the uniform distribution. That is, when an efficient algorithm gets a function, as a black box, it cannot tell, with non-negligible probability of success, according to which of the distributions it was chosen. To formalize this, we first define function ensembles, (concentrating on length-preserving functions).
Definition 2.1 (function ensembles)
A function ensemble is a sequence F = {Fn}nE~ of random variables, so that the random variable Fn assumes values in the set of functions mapping n-bit long strings to n-bit long strings. The uniform function ensemble, denoted R = has R,, uniformly distributed over the set of functions mapping n-bit long strings to n-bit long strings.
In our setting the distinguisher will have the form of an oracle machine that can make queries to a length preserving function, sampled from one of the two function ensembles. We assume that on input I n the oracle machine makes only n-bit long queries. In order for a p.r. function ensemble to be a practical substitute for the uniform function ensemble it must also be efficiently samplable and computable. At the following sections the term "p.r. functions" is used as an abbreviation for "efficiently computable p.r. function ensemble".
Pseudo-random Synthesizers
We begin by introducing some notations that are used in the paper.
Let 1 and IC be any two functions on the natural numbers, we denote by F = { F:$)))ncH an ensemble of functions mapping k(n)-bit long strings to l(n)-bit long strings.
Let X be any random vari8bble, we denote by Xkxz the k x 1 matrix whose entries are independently identically distributed according to X . We denote by X k the vector X w k . U, , denotes the random variable uniformly distributed over (0, l}n.
We identify functions of two variables and functions of one variable in the natural way: We take
, where x and y are n-bit long strings and x o y stands for x concatenated with y.
As mentioned above, we introduce in this paper a new cryptographic primitive called a p.r. synthesizer. Loosely speaking, p.r. synthesizers are efficiently computable functions of two variables that "merge" random bit sequences from two sources into one pseudo-random bit sequence. The significant feature of these functions is that they may reuse the input to each variable in all different combinations and their output still looks random. We first formalize the phrase "all different combinations". Proof. For every constant c > 0 we can define Sc in the following way: Define k, sf max{k : kC+l < n}.
For input x, y E (0, l},, regard the first k:+I bits of z and y as two k;-long sequences X and Y of k,-bit long strings. S' then outputs CONVs(X, Y ) (when we view it as a vector rather than a matrix). Notice that the following properties hold for Se:
S ' is indeed a p.r. synthesizer. Let X' and Y' be independently drawn from and let X and Y be independently drawn from Uknm(")". j f i o m the definition of S', for every polynomial m(3, the distributions CONVs=(X', Y') and CONVs(X, Y) are identical. Taking into account the fact that n is polynomial in k,, we conclude that every polynomial-time distinguisher for S' is also a polynomial-time distinguisher for S. Since S is a pseudo-random synthesizer so is S' .
ls=(n) = n(n"-.?.)). Since c is a constant and
S' is in NC' (resp. AC'). Immediate from the construction of 5''.
Thus, by taking S' to be S ' for any c > f -1 we obtain the lemma. 0
In the construction of per. functions in NC we assume the existence of p.r. synthesizers with linear output size in NC. In order to complete the construction it is enough, by Lemma 3.1, to show the existence of p.r. synthesizers with constant output size in NC.
Nevertheless, the construction in Lemma 3.1 has an obvious disadvantage. The security of the synthesizer we construct is related to the security of the original synthesizer on much smaller input size. Thus, to preserve sufficient security we must work with larger numbers, resulting in a substantial increase in the time and space complexity of any construction using this synthesizer. If we assume the existence of a p.r. generator G in NC such that 1G(s)1 = 2181 for every s, then we can use a simplified variant of the construction in [13] for an alternative construction to the one in Lemma 3.1. 
CONVs(X, Y ) .
It is easy to verify that S' is indeed a p.r. synthesizer in NC and that lsi(n) = p2(n)ls(n).
In this case, the security of S' relates to the security of S and G on the same input size. Nevertheless, the time complexity of S' is still substantially larger than the time complexity of S, and the parallel time complexity of S' might also be larger. We cannot assert that either of the two constructions of synthesizers with extended output size is automatically superior to the other.
A natural way to relax the definition of a p.r. synthesizer is to allow a distribution of functions for every input size rather than a single function. To formalize this we use the concept of an efficiently computable function ensemble which was defined in section 2. 
am
As we shall see, a collection of p.r. synthesizers is sufficient for the construction of p.r. functions. Working with a collection of synthesizers, rather than a single synthesizer, enables us to extract some of the computations into a preprocessing stage during the sampling. This is especially useful if apart from a sequential preprocessing stage all other computations can be done in parallel.
Most of our observations for synthesizers are easily extended to collections of synthesizers. The only subtle point is that in order to construct a p.r. generator from a collection of p.r. synthesizers we should use some of the bits of the seed to sample a function from the collection. Since the number of bits needed in order to sample is polynomial, we can use a similar construction to the one in Lemma 3.1 to ensure that we have enough bits to sample and that our output is large enough. We are now ready to present the main construction of this paper, the construction of p.r. functions, using p.r. synthesizers as building blocks. (Figure 1 illustrates the evaluation off, P for n = 5.) Note that for some collections of synthesizers (as those presented in this paper) we can reduce the overhead of keeping pog nl keys of the collection. Certainly, this is true when we are using a single synthesizer instead of a collection. In this case we don't have to keep any key, since there is a single key for every input size. Moreover, if the collection of synthesizers remains secure even when it uses a public key (i.e. even if the distinguisher algorithm gets access to the key) then we can replace the pognl keys with a single one.
Assume that the functions in S are in NC (so the p.r. functions we construct are in N C ) and that there exists a p.r. generator G in NC, such that IG(s)l = 2151 for every s. In this case, a natural modification to the construction is to replace, for every fa,i, the sequence a' with an n-bit long seed 5. At the beginning of each application of f a , z we can obtain a' by applying G' to 6, where G' is the p.r. generator that can be constructed from G according to Theorem 3.2 (for p ( n ) = 2n, i.e. by using pogn + 1) levels of the recursion.) Any efficient distinguisher between the new function ensemble, obtained by the modification, and the original one can be used to efficiently distinguish between the output of G' and the uniform distribution. Thus, the two function ensembles are computationally indistinguishable. Actually, there is no need for the separate assumptions on the existence of G. We can use the synthesizers in S --a,= -instead (after further expanding their output by similar construction to the one in L~~~~ 3.1).
Note that the length of the strings in a' determines the security of the functions. There is no real reason for the strings to be n-bit long (where n is the length of the strings the functions are applied on). It is immediate from the definition (for n = 2') and obvious from the description (for other n's) that H: and F, are identically distributed and that H;logn1 and R,., are identically distributed. Thus, by the assumption, we can distinguish between the extreme hybrid distributions. Therefore, applying the standard hybrid argument we can distinguish between neighboring hybrid distributions. We show how to use this to construct a distinguisher D for the p.r. synthesizers. 
Since M makes no more than t(n) queries and for each query we need n o more than n new entries we get that the size of B is suficient for this process (because m(n) = t(n)n).
It is obvious that D is a polynomial-time algorithm, we now show that D is also a distinguisher for the p.r. This contradicts the assumption that S is a collection of p.r. synthesizers, therefore it completes the proof of Keeping in mind the last corollary, we shift our focus to the parallel construction of p.r. synthesizers.
Construction of P.R. Synthesizers Based on Cryptographic Primitives
In the next two sections we show constructions of p.r. synthesizers. In this section we provide constructions of p.r. synthesizers from other cryptographic primitives: what we call weak p.r. functions and trapdoor permutations. In the next section we show constructions based on concrete intractability assumptions. We do not know of efficient parallel constructions of p.r. synthesizers from p.r. generators, or directly from one-way functions.
The reason that p,r. functions are hard to construct is that they must endure very powerful attacks. Their adversary (the distinguisher) may query their values at every point, and may adapt his queries based on the answers it gets. We can weaken the strength of the o p ponent by letting him access only to a polynomial sample of random points and the value of the function at these points. We show that even the functions obtained under this condition simply defines p.r. synthesizers. 
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= 1 1 1 < Defining weak p.r. functions as length-preserving is an arbitrary choice. We might as well consider weak p.r. functions of different output length. The construction of the p.r. synthesizer does not change.
From the previous lemma, if there exist weak p.r.
functions that can be sampled and evaluated in NC then we also have a p.r. synthesizer in N C and therefore by Construction 4.1 we also have p.r. functions that can be sampled and evaluated in N C .
As a direct result from the previous lemma we can get a construction of a p.r. defined to be b,(f,-'(D(i, z)) ). We claim (without proof) that the collection {g,} (with the same distribution over the keys as this of the f,'s) is a collection of weak p.r. functions.
Construction of P.R. Synthesizers Based on Concrete Intractability Assumptions
In this section we present two NC1 constructions of p.r. synthesizers based on concrete, frequently-used, intractability assumptions: the Difie-Hellman and the RSA assumptions. We first address issues that are common to both the constructions.
The functions in both the collections of p.r. synthesizers we construct can be evaluated in NC', the key generating algorithms, though, are sequential. We make use of the fact that some operations, like exponentiation, can be done efficiently in parallel, given an additional preprocessed data. In this idea we follow the work of Kearns and Valiant, [24] ; in their context, the additional data is "forced" into the input, whereas in our context it is added to the key.
The efficient parallel evaluation of the synthesizers is based on known results in parallel computation of arithmetic operations (see Karp and Ramachandran [23] for a review). In particular we use the result of Beame, Cook and Hoover, 111, that enables modular multiplication of n numbers of length n bits (among other operations) by log-depth circuits. The construction of these circuits can be easily done in the sequential preprocessing stage of the sampling.
The p.r. synthesizers we construct are Boolean functions. In section 3 we showed two methods to expand the output size of p.r. synthesizers. The p.r. generator presented by Blum, Blum and Shub [4] and the one presented by Hastad, Schrift and Shamir [17] are natural candidates for the p.r. generator needed by the method based on Theorem 3.2. Both generators can be made to work efficiently in parallel (after a sequential preprocessing stage). And the security of both of them is based on a principal number-theoretical intractability assumption, the intractability of factoring integers (Blum integers in [17] ).
This seems to be a good place to make the comparison between the two methods of expansion, discussed above, more concrete. Assume that we are using Boolean synthesizers (instead of synthesieers with linear output size) for Construction 4.1 of p.r. functions.
The method of Lemma 3.1 forces us to replace the n-bit long strings with n2-bit long strings (in order to preserve the security). We also need O(n3) applications of the synthesizers instead of O(n). The parallel time complexity is unchanged. Using the method based on Theorem 3.2 we can preserve the length of the strings we use, and we need O(n2) applications of the synthesizers and of the generator. The increase in the parallel time complexity is logarithmic (for the generators and synthesizers discussed in this section). This illustrates the advantage of a direct construction of parallel synthesizers with linear output size (rather than constructions that go through any one of the methods).
We use, in our constructions, the result of Goldreich and Levin, [15] . They showed an hard-core predicate for "any" one-way function. We use their result in a slightly different context, loosely speaking, if it is hard to compute g(x), given f ( x ) , then it is also hard to guess g(x).r. We also use the next-bit prediction tests of Blum and Micali [6], the equivalence between p.r. ensembles and ensembles that pass all polynomial time next-bit tests was shown by Yao 1341.
The Diffie-Hellman Assumption
In this subsection we define a collection of p.r. synthesizers based on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. For concreteness, we state the Diffie-Hellman assumption in terms of the group Z;, but, our construction works, just m well, for other groups. We assumed nothing on the distribution of P , and, in a sense, we might consider P to be constant for every output size. , where X and Y are independently drawn from U,,"'"), is not pseudorandom. Thus, there exists an efficient next-bit prediction test T and a polynomial qc) such that, for infinitely many n's, T succeeds to predict the next bit of a prefix (of uniformly chosen length) of (En) with probability greater then 4 + A.
Given P , g, go mod P and g b mod P as in the DiffieHellman assumption and a uniformly chosen r E (0,1}" We showed in section 6 a general construction of p.r. synthesizers out of trapdoor one-way permutations. Nevertheless, in the case of the RSA-functions we have to adjust this construction in order to get efficient parallel synthesizers. To enable preprocessing (and, thus, achieve the desired efficiency) we employ in our construction the subset product function. Let G be a finite group, for every n-tuple y'= {yl, . . . , yn} of elements in G and n-bit string x = XI.. .xn define SPc,p(x) to be the product in G of the elements yi such that xi = 1.
We use the following lemma that was shown by Impagliazzo and Naor in [21] , and is based on the leftover hash lemma of [20, 221. We can now define the p.r. synthesizers. The guessing algorithm uniformly chooses 1 be 5 mod cp(N), where z is uniformly distributed over the set of 2n-bit strings that are relatively primes to e. Notice, that although the algorithm do not know and dj it can still computes all values of B apart to b,,j. We shall show that the distribution of B is statistically indistinguishable within an exponentially small amount from the distribution of En. Thus, if we feed T with the bits of B until the entry ( i , j ) it predicts bj,j = (m' mod N)+r with probability greater than, say, In order to complete the proof all we have to show is that B is indeed statistically indistinguishable from E,,.
Since e is relatively prime to p(N) (because it is a large prime) and for every s, m, is uniformly distributed over Zf,, we get that (m,)C is also uniformly distributed over Zf, for every s. By Lemma 7.4, we have that the distribution of ( m , ) e is statistically close to the distribution of g+ = SPz;,g(c) for uniformly chosen x E {0, lIan and Notice also that for z that is chosen from U',, the distribution of 4 mod p(N)
and U ' , mod cp(N) is statistically close. Since e is a large prime, even after restricting the z's to be relatively primes to e, the distributions are close. Given these two observations it is obvious that the distribution of B is statistically indistinguishable within an exponentially small amount from the distribution of En, and the contradiction to the RSA-assumption follows. Note that both the p.r. synthesizers constructed in this section may allow their key to be public. This means that we can use a single synthesizer at all levels of Construction 4.1.
P.R. Synthesizers and Hard Learning Problems
In this section we discuss several aspects of the connection between p.r. synthesizers and hard-to-learn functions.
Blum, Furst, Kearns and Lipton [3], show how to construct several cryptographic primitives out of hardto-learn functions, in a way that preserves the degree of parallelism of the functions. A major motivation for presenting such constructions is the simplicity of function classes that are believed to be hard for efficient learning. We show that, under the definitions of [3], p.r. synthesizers can easily be constructed from distributions on functions that are hard to learn. Thus, by the constructions showed in this paper we can add to the cryptographic primitives, constructed in [3], constructions of p.r. functions and of p.r. generators with large expansion ratio (without assuming, as in [3] , that the functions are hard for learning when membership queries are allowed).
There is a difference between standard learningtheory definitions and standard cryptographic definitions. Loosely speaking, a collection of concepts is hard to learn if for every efficient algorithm there exists a distribution over the concepts that is hard for this specific algorithm to learn. In cryptographic settings the order of quantifiers is reversed: the hard distribution should be hard for every efficient algorithm. In order for hardlearning problems to be useful in cryptographic settings an average-case learning model is presented in [3].
Informally describing one of the definitions in 131, we can say that a distribution ensemble of functions, Efficient synthesizer from a concrete hard-tolearn problem: Consider the following distribution on functions with parameters k and n. Select at random two disjoint sets A, B c { 1, . . . , n} each of size k.
Given input z E {0,1}" compute the parity of the bits indexed by A and the majority of the bits indexed by B; Output the exclusive-or of these values. Blum et. al.
[3], estimate that these functions, for k = log n, cannot be weakly predictable without using "profoundly" new ideas. If this distribution of functions is not weakly predictable on the average, with respect to the uniform distribution, then it defines an extremely efficient synthesizer. Therefore, using the constructions of this paper, we get efficient parallel p.r. functions.
P.R. Functions in NC1
Linial, Mansour and Nisan [27] show that there are no p.r. functions in ACo with security better than npo'y'og(n). Kharitonov [25] showed that after preprocessing, a polynomial size p.r. bit sequence (based on [4]) can be produced in NC1 (the length of the sequence can stay undetermined at the preprocessing stage). Regarding these results, one may ask, are there p.r. functions in NC'. We show that, under strong enough assumptions, our constructions yield a positive answer.
Notice that, unlike the rest of the paper, the reduction in this section, from p.r. functions in N C 2 to p.r. functions in NC' substantially reduces the security of the functions.
Let F = {F,,}nE~ be a p.r. function ensemble such that its functions are computable in N C 2 . Assume also that no distinguisher with running time n0(logn) can distinguish between F and the uniform function ensemble with success probability n-n(logn), we construct the ensemble G = {Gn}Em. Using Levin's idea [26] (mentioned in the Introduction) the functions in Gn hash (with a secret hash function) n-bit long strings to 2 G -b i t long strings and apply the functions in F 2~. The functions of G can be computed in NC', furthermore, as long as no two strings are hashed to the same value, the success probability of any distinguisher algorithm for distinguishing G, and the uniform distribution, is not greater than for distinguishing F2+ and the uniform distribution. Since any polynomial-time distinguisher algorithm has probability 2-n(2G) to cause collisions for the hash function, we can conclude from the assumptions on F that no such algorithm can distinguish between G and the uniform functions ensemble with success probability -* ) .
Thus, G is a p.r. function ensemble in NC'.
Notice that all the constructions in the paper (apart from the last one) are "security-preserving". In particular if we define the next property for cryptographic primitives: uno algorithm with running time n0(logn) can break this primitive with success probe bility n-n(logn)", then our constructions preserve this property. Thus, if for example, this property holds for the Diffie-Hellman assumption, we get a construction of p-r. functions in NC'.
Note that, if we make stronger assumptions on the security of F , we can conclude stronger estimates for the security of G. The only upper bound on the security of G that holds regardless of the security of F is 2°(2G).
For example, if we assume that F has security 2"' for some E > 0 we get that G has security of 20(2'JI;;;;;)
